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Introduction 
Much has already been written about the devolved Scottish 
Parliament‟s Tartan Tax-varying powers (for example Blow et 
al. 1996, Darby et al. 2002, Heald and Geaughan 1996 
and 1999, Heald et al. 1998, Heald and McLeod 2002, 
McGregor et al. 1997, Midwinter 2002, Muscatelli 2001, 
SPICe 2002). Much less has been written about other 
revenue raising options and it is the contention of this 
paper that the focus of attention on Tartan Tax-varying 
powers has been misplaced. 
 
The Tartan Tax literature notes that tax-varying powers are 
only partial and heavily restricted, being more symbolic 
than real, and making little or no difference in terms of total 
financial resources available to the Scottish Executive than 
what would have been the case in the absence of 
devolution. In other words, except for relatively high council 
tax bills (not a decision of the Scottish Parliament per se), 
the structure, rates and/or levels of taxation in Scotland 
are those of the UK. 
 
It is perhaps not surprising that the Scottish Parliament‟s 
Tartan Tax-varying powers remain unused. The UK Labour 
Government plans real term increases in the Scottish Block 
grant of 4.4 per cent per annum up to 2005/06 (Treasury 
2002a). Moreover, public expenditure is already relatively 
high in both per capita terms and as a percentage of GDP 
(Nelson 2003). In fact, rather than adding to the UK tax 
rate on basic incomes there seems to be more scope for 
reducing the UK basic rate. This is evidenced by various 
decisions of the Scottish Parliament leading to lost rev- 
enues and/or increased expenditures (Mitchell et al. 2001). 
First, the more generous recent pay award to teachers in 
Scottish schools than in English schools. Second, the 
abolition of up-front university tuition fees, leading to the 
increased take-up of university places. Third, the abolition 
of charges for personal care of the elderly, leading to 
increased take-up of residential and community-care 
services.  Fourth, making provision for free off-peak local 
bus travel for all elderly and disabled concessionary 
cardholders, and as extended to peak hours by some local 
authorities. 
 
These decisions may not have been properly costed, for 
example as subsequently claimed by Scottish local authori- 
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ties in respect of free personal care. Nevertheless, they do 
indicate the possibility of using the Tartan Tax-varying 
powers to reduce income tax in Scotland, had those 
decisions to scrap charges and/or increase expenditures 
not been made. 
 
Specifically Scottish spending decisions are not funded via 
the Barnett Formula, which gives Scotland a predetermined 
proportion of incremental public expenditures in England. 
Hence, the financial implications of abolition of charges in 
Scotland but not in England will not be allowed for in the 
Scottish Block grant paid by the Westminster government to 
the Holyrood government. Thus, unless those decisions 
have been properly costed, the Block may provide insuffi- 
cient money to finance these decisions. In addition, the UK- 
level of government may be unwilling to fully fund (via 
„Barnett bypass‟) pay awards that are more generous in 
Scotland than in England. If it does actually exist, the so- 
called Barnett Squeeze would add to the financial pres- 
sures impinging upon the Scottish Budget. Nevertheless, 
these and other pressures will not require the Tartan Tax to 
be levied as long as cost savings can be made for other 
devolved services and/or other sources of finance can be 
increased (see below). 
 
 
Potential Tartan Tax revenues 
Any change in the rate of Tartan Tax is limited to a maxi- 
mum of plus or minus 3p in the pound and only applies to 
the basic rate of personal income tax, not to the higher or 
lower rates. Moreover, the Tartan Tax cannot be levied on 
income from savings and distributions (i.e. interest pay- 
ments and dividends from shares): it is levied on earned 
income from employment. Earned income was only 57 per 
cent of personal income for PAYE income tax purposes in 
1999 (Scottish Executive 2002a). Clearly, the Tartan Tax 
base is relatively narrow when compared with total personal 
income. 
 
Besides being affected by the net change in tax allowances, 
the tax revenue is also clearly affected by changes in total 
employment incomes within the basic rate tax bracket. 
Originally, the UK Treasury estimated that each additional 
penny of Tartan Tax would raise £150 million per annum. 
This estimate was derived from the restricted Scottish basic 
rate personal income tax base in 1997/98. However, the 
base of the basic rate band of UK personal income tax was 
broadened in the 1999 budget. This led to an increased 
estimated revenue yield from one penny of Tartan Tax to 
£230 million per annum. Although this would enable more 
revenue to be raised for a given tax rate, this sharp change 
perhaps demonstrated just how volatile the Tartan Tax base 
can be in reflecting UK central government decisions. 
However, the Scotland Act 1998 s76 makes provision for 
the UK Treasur y to of fset such volatility relative to the 
amounts that would have been raised in 1997/98 after 
making due allowances for changes in the retail prices 
index. 
It seems reasonable to compare inflation of employment 
earnings and of retail prices with Treasury estimates of the 
yield of the Tartan Tax to analyse changes over time in the 
real yield of the Tax. Had there been no changes to the 
basic rate tax base, and had that base increased in line 
with the increase in average Scottish employment earnings, 
the resulting revenues would have been those presented in 
Table 1. Of course, the earnings index includes those in the 
lower, basic and higher rate tax brackets. Hence, use of the 
average growth of all earnings (rather than only of earnings 
within the basic rate tax band) is an approximation of broad 
magnitudes rather than a precise calculation. 
 
However, any distortion is perhaps unlikely to be significant. 
The arithmetic average growth of employment earnings is 
generally inflated by more rapid growth of the highest 
incomes, these not being within the Tartan Tax band. 
Nevertheless, the arithmetic average is also reduced by 
relatively slow growth of the lowest incomes, these also 
generally not being within the base of the Tartan Tax. This is 
because the combined effect of the personal allowance, 
the starting rate tax band and the working families tax 
credit and children‟s tax credit (and their successor credits) 
means that the lowest earned incomes do not pay basic 
rate tax. These two effects will tend to be offsetting such 
that use of average earnings seems justified. 
 
Table 1 also shows what revenues would have been if they 
had kept up with inflation as measured by the index of 
retail prices (RPI). Both sets of figures can be compared 
with the Treasur y estimates. The potential Tartan Tax 
receipts rose between 1999 and 2000 faster than the RPI 
but then fell by 2.1% and then by 1.0 per cent in real terms 
in 2001 and 2002 respectively. This is because the UK 
Treasur y‟s estimates of potential Tartan Tax revenues 
remained constant in those two years whilst the RPI rose. 
The real value of the potential Tartan Tax yield fell faster 
against the Scottish employment earnings index because 
the rise in earnings was substantially greater than the rise 
in the RPI. 
 
Comparing the cumulative totals in Table 1, it is clear that 
potential Tartan Tax revenues did not keep up with either 
retail price inflation or growth of average employment 
earnings during the fir st four year term of the Scottish 
Parliament. Changes in the costs of providing public services 
approximate changes in average earnings more closely than 
changes in retail prices because wages and salaries account 
for a high proportion of service costs. Thus, there was a fairly 
substantial decline in the real value of potential Tartan Tax 
revenues during the first term of the 
Scottish Parliament. 
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Table 2 calculates annual tax receipts resulting from a 1p 
Tartan Tax rate over the following four years assuming they 
keep up with an RPI of 2.5 per cent in each year and, 
alternatively, with annual growth of Scottish employment 
earnings of 5 per cent. Whilst these rates are arbitrary, they 
broadly reflect the situation in 2000/01 (see Table 1) and 
also the fact that Scottish average employment earnings 
generally rise twice as fast as retail prices. For example, 
between 1991 and 2001 the UK RPI rose by 31 per cent 
whereas average employment earnings in Scotland rose by 
61 per cent. More recently, between 1997 and 2002 retail 
prices rose 13.0 per cent whilst Scottish earnings in- 
creased by 26.8 per cent. The differential in growth rates of 
earnings and prices assumed in Table 2 is therefore typical 
of past trends. Nevertheless, the resulting financial figures 
are simplistic and purely illustrative, not being meant to be 
forecasts.   They assume no fur ther changes to the basic 
rate tax base (e.g. no net change in allowances) and 
„constant employment‟. 
If the Scottish Executive had levied a Tartan Tax during the 
first four years of the Scottish Parliament it could have 
raised £930 million from a 1p tax rate, according to 
Treasury estimates (Table 1).  In its second four-year term of 
office it would raise either £978.95 million or £1040.90 
million (on the assumed growth rates) from a 1p tax rate. 
These figures are doubled by a 2p tax rate and tripled by a 
3p tax rate, assuming that the extra tax receipts have no 
adverse effects on the Scottish economy in terms of 
disincentives to work or to invest. 
 
As already noted, the Tartan Tax base should be index linked 
to the growth of total taxable incomes (rather than average 
earnings) within the basic rate tax bracket and also 
adjusted by the net changes since 1999 in total allowances 
against (basic rate) personal income tax.  They should also 
be adjusted by changes in the tax thresholds determining 
the width of the basic rate tax band.  Some tax allowances 
have been withdrawn, others introduced and increased. 
Calculation of the net change for Scotland is therefore 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1: Products of 1p Tartan Tax rate 
 
 
 
 
Year 
 
Growth of 
UK RPI (%) 
 
Tax Product  (£m) 
if linked to RPI 
Growth in Scottish 
Employment 
Earnings Index (%) 
 
Tax Product (£m) if 
linked to earnings 
 
Treasury 
Estimate (£m) 
 
1999  
 
230.00  
 
230.00 
 
230.00 
2000 3.0 236.90 5.0 241.50 240.00 
2001 2.1 241.87 5.6 255.02 230.00 
2002 1.0 244.29 5.6 269.30 230.00 
 
Cumulative Total  
 
953.06  
 
995.82 
 
930.00 
 
 
 
Sources: HM Treasury, Office of National Statistics and authors’ calculations. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2: Illustrative calculations of future products of 1p Tartan Tax rate  (£ million) 
 
 
 
2002  Treasury Tax Product of £230  million Indexed to: 
RPI of +2.5% p.a. Earnings Growth of 5% p.a. Column B 
Year 
 
2003 
Column  A 
 
235.75 
(Column B) 
 
241.50 
minus  Column  A 
 
5.75 
2004 241.64 253.58 11.94 
2005 247.68 266.25 18.57 
2006 253.88 279.57 25.69 
Cumulative Totals 2002-2006 978.95 1040.90 61.95 
 
 
 
Source: authors’ calculations 
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problematic and no attempt can be made to adjust for 
unknown future changes.  This emphasises that the figures 
in Table 2 are purely illustrative of broad magnitudes: they 
are not predictions. 
 
Besides being constrained by the maximum change in tax 
rate and the doubly restricted tax base, exercise of the tax- 
varying powers may be further restricted by the UK govern- 
ment changing other taxes.  Any substantial changes in the 
UK-level structure of personal income tax and/or national 
insurance contributions (NICs) will, almost inevitably, take 
precedence over use of the tax-varying powers by the 
Scottish Parliament. A possible scenario is where the 
combined effect of UK-level changes to the rate or structure 
of income tax and/or NICs and Scottish-level changes to 
the rate of the Tartan Tax results in a significantly lower 
level of take-home pay in Scotland. 
 
The UK Labour Government announced four increases in 
NICs as from April 2003. First, a one per cent increase in 
both employees‟ and employers‟ NICs. Second, the applica- 
tion of that increase not just above the employees‟ lower 
earnings limit, but also above the upper earnings limit. 
Third, the freezing of the lower earnings limit above which 
NICs are paid (i.e. no upward adjustment for inflation). 
Fourth, the increase in the upper earnings limit in line with 
retail prices rather than earnings (the former rising more 
slowly than the latter, as already noted). The combined effect 
of these increases in employees‟ NICs is estimated to 
reduce take-home pay by more than £5 a week for those on 
middle incomes. This is broadly the same group as those 
who would have to pay the Tartan Tax levied on earnings 
subject to the basic rate of UK tax.   Thus, the Scottish 
Parliament may feel unable to levy the Tartan Tax in the 
foreseeable future. 
 
Employees‟ NICs may be regarded as personal income tax 
by another name, especially as the structures of both forms 
of taxation are being progressively reformed so that they 
increasingly correspond with each other. Even if taxpayers 
do regard NICs as separate from income tax, the fact is that 
the increased payments of NICs leave taxpayers with less 
disposable income. This is exacerbated by the fact that the 
tax base for NICs is not total income but, instead, earnings 
from employment. Like the Tartan Tax, NICs are not paid on 
unearned income from savings and dividends. 
 
Levying the Tartan Tax would therefore cause an even 
greater differential between the taxation of earned versus 
unearned incomes, with possible adverse effects on 
economic growth within Scotland. Adding the Tartan Tax at 
a rate of 3p in the £ to employees‟ NICs of 11p in the 
pound (between the lower and upper earnings limits) 
means that these middle earnings would be taxed at an 
even higher rate than unearned incomes in Scotland. Thus, 
the Scottish Executive may feel unable to reduce dispos- 
able income further by adding to the tax take on earnings. 
The restriction would be made more severe if account is 
taken of all central government taxes paid by Scottish 
taxpayers. Thus changes in the structure and/or rates of 
VAT, and of other taxes on expenditure, could further 
restrict changes in the rate of Tartan Tax.  Besides UK 
central government taxes, sharp changes in the rate of 
council tax in Scotland could also impinge upon the ability 
of the Scottish Parliament to vary simultaneously the rate 
of Tartan Tax. 
 
The constraints on tax rate increases may be paralleled by 
political restraints on tax rate reductions. Given the rela- 
tively high level of public expenditure in Scotland (noted 
above) a tax rate reduction may be seen as confirmation of 
claims that Scotland is over-subsidised. Thus, there is 
considerable uncertainty about just how far the Scottish 
Parliament can actually exercise its tax-varying powers in 
practice. 
 
This makes clear the somewhat misleading claim in the 
1997 White Paper „Scotland‟s Parliament‟ (Cm 3658) that a 
regional income tax is broadly based, simple and easy to 
understand and viable. It is clear that the Tartan Tax is not 
as broad based as it could be, doubtful whether the 
Scottish electorate fully appreciates how that base is 
determined and doubtful whether it is wor th using in 
practice. 
 
As noted above, a Tartan Tax rate of 1p would have raised 
£230 million in 2002. Planned devolved spending in that 
year was £17,775 million. Thus, a Tartan Tax rate of 1p in 
the £ would add only 1.3 per cent to devolved expenditure. 
Hence, the maximum amount by which devolved expendi- 
ture could be increased would be only 3.9 per cent. The 
illustrative figures in Table 2 are likewise relatively modest. 
In practice, these low propor tionate figures are further 
reduced because collection costs will be deducted from any 
revenues raised by the Tartan Tax. By way of comparison, 
Scottish local authorities finance 15 per cent of their 
general fund revenue expenditure from council tax. 
 
 
Political parties’ policy proposals 
The Scottish Labour Party promised not to use the Tartan 
Tax during its first four-year term of office, this policy 
subsequently being adopted by the Labour/Liberal Demo- 
cratic coalition which formed the Scottish Executive in 
1999. There is no indication thus far that this will change in 
its second term of office following the May 2003 election. 
Indeed, none of the main political parties‟ manifestos for 
those elections proposed levying the Tartan Tax. 
 
The Liberal Democrats proposed a local income tax (LIT) 
and to allow each local authority to retain the business 
rates income generated in its area, making local authorities 
responsible for raising the majority of their own income. 
However, they would also transfer Health Board functions 
and water and sewerage to local government. The introduc- 
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tion of the LIT and the transfer of service responsibilities to 
local government would reduce the need for a Liberal 
Democrat-controlled Scottish Parliament to levy the Tartan 
Tax. 
 
In contrast to the Liberal Democrats‟ transfer of service 
responsibilities to local government, the Conservatives 
proposed to remove from local authorities responsibility for 
education and health-related social services in order to 
reduce the burden on council tax. The Conservatives 
pledged to cut taxes on people and businesses whilst 
maintaining the levels and standards of public ser vices. 
This they planned to achieve by reducing inefficiency in 
service provision, by reducing wasteful use of public 
finance, and by using the extra tax revenues generated by 
economic growth. Whilst proposing to restore a uniform 
business rate poundage across the UK, the Scottish 
Conservatives also pledged to cut business rates for rural 
shops, pubs & village post offices (many already qualifying 
for 50% mandator y relief). In fact, the Local Government in 
Scotland Act 2003 subsequently extended mandatory 
reliefs for qualifying food stores and cer tain agricultural and 
heritage subjects. Promising tax cuts, it seems unlikely that 
a Conservative controlled Scottish Parliament would levy 
the Tartan Tax. 
 
The Scottish National Party (SNP) wants full financial and 
political independence for the Scottish Parliament. Full 
independence would require all taxes to be set and col- 
lected by Scottish government. Hence, the Scotland Act 
1998 and the associated tax-varying powers would be 
redundant. Nevertheless, in practice, if not in principle, an 
independent Scotland‟s tax-varying powers may still be 
constrained because there may be an element of tax 
competition between England and Scotland, each country 
restraining (if not cutting) the levels of taxes it imposes on 
geographically mobile business and labour. 
 
If elected to power, the Scottish Socialist Party (SSP) 
promised to abolish council tax, replacing it with a Scottish 
Service Tax (SST). Based on a proposal by academics at the 
University of Paisley (Danson and Whittam 2002), it is said 
to be a local income tax. This would only be the case if local 
authorities were free to set their own rates of tax. In fact, 
the Paisley academics propose that the rate be set by the 
Scottish Parliament, the revenues from which would be 
dedicated to local government. 
 
Although workable and able to raise potentially ver y large 
amounts of tax receipts, doubts have been expressed about 
whether such a tax falls within the remit of the Scotland Act 
1998. As already noted, the tax-varying powers specified in 
the Act relate to the basic rate of UK income tax and are 
limited to plus or minus 3p in the £ of employment earn- 
ings. The highly progressive SST would alter the higher rate 
as well as the basic rate. This would be contrary to the Act. 
This is why the SSP and Paisley academics refer (rather 
disingenuously) to the SST as a local income tax. In fact it is 
a regional tax, the revenues of which are assigned to local 
government, in the same way as business rates.  Thus 
whilst workable, the SST may not be within the legal 
competence of the Scottish Parliament. If it were within the 
Parliament‟s legal competence, it would limit the ability of 
the Scottish Parliament to raise the Tartan Tax to improve 
the NHS and other services not financed by the SST. 
 
The only party planning to use the tax-varying powers was 
the newly formed Scottish People‟s Alliance, a radical right- 
of-centre party committed to minimalist government. 
However, rather than increase the tax rate, the Alliance 
promised an immediate cut of 3p in the pound. This could 
lead to the political problems noted above in terms of 
reinforcing perceptions of an over-subsidised and now 
under-taxed Scotland. 
 
The lack of commitment of any mainstream political party 
to levy the Tartan Tax during the second term of the 
Scottish Parliament gives more substance to warnings that 
this devolved power would prove to be a watchdog that 
would not bark (Jackson 1999) and would soon atrophy 
(Heald and Geaughan 1997). 
 
 
Other revenue raising powers 
Besides the Tartan Tax, the Scottish Parliament also has 
the power to vary the rate of the property tax paid by 
Scottish businesses and other non-domestic rateable 
properties. In practice, however, that tax-varying power has 
been heavily constrained by the perceived need to harmo- 
nise Scottish business property tax bills with those paid by 
businesses in England. In its response (Scottish Executive 
1999) to the report of the Commission on Local Govern- 
ment and the Scottish Parliament (McIntosh 1999), the 
Scottish Executive committed itself to maintaining the 
principles of cross-border harmonisation and a level playing 
field for business and industry, Scotland vis-à-vis England. 
Allowing for transitional arrangements following revaluation 
(Heald and McLeod 2002), this means that differences in 
business rate poundages between Scotland and England 
will be offset by opposite differences in average valuations 
such that average tax bills (as dis tinct from tax rates) are 
harmonised. Nevertheless, the Conservatives pledged to 
harmonise (i.e. cut) tax rates. 
 
Thus business rates will not be used actively to raise 
additional tax revenues for Scotland and so the tax rev- 
enues raised will effectively be determined by the UK 
central government‟s decisions in respect of business rates 
in England. Business rates would be made variable under 
some political parties‟ proposals but at the local (rather 
than regional) level. 
 
The most feasible tax option would be to broaden the base 
of council tax to raise more revenue for a given tax rate 
(Scottish Executive 2002b). Subject to approval by the 
Scottish Parliament, the Local Government in Scotland Act 
Vol.28 No.3, pp.30-37. 
 
 
 
2003 allows Ministers to set council tax charges for second 
homes and long-term empty homes, these currently being 
half-rated. Although not allowed for by the Act, the council 
tax base could also be broadened by reducing the 25% 
deduction for single person households. Adding more 
valuation bands at the top and bottom of the council tax 
range (so that they are, respectively, larger and smaller 
multiples of Band D) would not in itself raise more tax 
revenue. Nevertheless, broadening the tax base in this way 
could make higher rates of council tax more politically 
acceptable. However, the UK government could reduce the 
Scottish Block if local authority self-financed expenditure 
(i.e. funded by council tax) in Scotland grew significantly 
faster than in England and/or was inconsistent with 
macroeconomic policy (Treasur y 2002b). 
 
Likewise exemptions from business rates could be can- 
celled in order to broaden the tax base. Currently, sporting 
estates, agricultural land and churches are exempt from 
business rates. Many charitable organisations also have 
their rates liability abated in full (80% mandator y, 20% 
discretionary). Such exemptions are questionable, espe- 
cially where they reflect past practice rather than current 
conditions. Moreover, those tax exemptions may be offset 
by higher rents and leases, with the result that the main 
beneficiary is the landowner or property owner - not the 
tenant.  In fact, as already noted, the Local Government in 
Scotland Act 2003 extended reliefs against business rates 
for certain agricultural properties and heritages. 
 
Nationalisation of business rates and the consequent 
severing of links between councils and businesses in their 
jurisdictions has led to proposals for the establishment of 
business improvement districts (BIDs) in the UK. The Local 
Government Act 2003 confirmed the UK Labour Govern- 
ment‟s White Paper (Cm 5237) proposal to introduce BIDs 
in England. They will work in partnership with local authori- 
ties in areas with identifiable business communities (ODPM 
2002).  Enabling legislation is expected to be operational in 
2004. They will have to be approved by a majority of 
businesses in the BID, payment of the resulting additional 
business property tax then being compulsory. They will not 
be levied on domestic properties in the BID areas, even 
though they are expected to benefit. BIDs could make a 
valuable additional financial contribution for improvement 
of specific business areas within cities. They could be used 
to finance crime prevention (e.g. CCTV cameras), remedial 
measures (e.g. dealing with vandalism), more frequent bus 
services to shopping centres (especially if „out of town‟), 
local training and employment schemes etc.  Either ena- 
bling legislation would have to be passed or individual 
authorities would have to promote BIDs bills through the 
Scottish Parliament. 
 
Non-tax income sources include service charges, grants 
raised through competitive bidding systems (e.g. regenera- 
tion funds and the „good causes‟ grants financed by the 
National Lottery), donations and bequests, and payments- 
in-kind such as planning gain/obligations. It is not, how- 
ever, possible to gain additional revenues from privatisation 
receipts, trading surpluses or from increases in council 
rents greater than those allowed for by the UK government. 
The UK government has made clear that it would make 
offsetting adjustments to the Scottish block grant, in the 
rents case because of the greater than expected payments 
of Housing Benefit that the UK government would have to 
make (Treasury 2002b). 
 
The scope for charging for public services in Scotland is 
greater than may generally be thought. “The general 
principle that applies is if a devolved administration 
chooses to charge more, the additional negative public 
expenditure receipts will accrue to its budget and if it 
chooses to charge less it will need to meet the costs from 
within its budget” (Treasury 2002b p. 21). 
 
Charges are already levied to varying extents for many 
municipal services. These include charges for school 
meals, library information services, day nurseries, car 
parking, burials and crematoria, admission to special 
exhibitions in museums and galleries and so on. However, 
both relative and absolute amounts raised are small. 
Excluding rents, charges generally raise only about a third 
of the amount raised by council tax and Scottish local 
authorities raised an average of only £1.25 per head per 
week in the late 1990s, of which just over a quarter came 
from planning and economic development (Accounts 
Commission 1998). 
 
Thus, there is probably considerable scope to increase 
existing levels of charges, particularly if low-income groups 
benefited from means tested (and therefore reduced) 
charges and service vouchers. As regards introduction of 
new charges, ring-fenced city road (congestion) charges are 
currently being considered. Though they could raise 
relatively large sums of money for public transport in 
Scottish cities, the experience of the London congestion 
charge is that less money has been raised than was first 
expected. 
 
Outside local government, whilst it was noted above that 
up-front university tuition fees have been scrapped, there is 
still considerable potential for more use to be made of 
charges, for example charging patients who miss appoint- 
ments with their general practitioners or hospitals. Never- 
theless, there is currently considerable political pressure 
building to reduce water charges levied on Scottish busi- 
nesses (these being relatively high when compared with 
those in England). 
 
 
Conclusions 
It seems highly unlikely that the Tartan Tax will be levied in 
the foreseeable future. This is ironic given the Yes: Yes 
outcome of the referendum for the Scottish Parliament 
(Scotland Forward 1998).  Nevertheless, the Tartan Tax 
would raise relatively little extra tax revenue net of collec- 
tion costs and is perhaps not yet justifiable given the 
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present UK Labour Government‟s plans to increase public 
expenditure in real terms and Scotland‟s already relatively 
high level of public spending. 
 
The only substantially untapped and sustainable source of 
truly additional revenues that would not be affected by 
offsetting changes through the Scottish Block is charging 
for public services. The UK Government‟s view is that 
revenue from fees and charges (excluding council rents) 
should not be subject to any form of resource equalisation. 
In fact, the Scottish Parliament seems more prone to 
abolish service charges than to increase them and/or 
extend their coverage. Whether in an upward or downward 
direction, the Scottish Parliament is obviously much more 
willing to vary non-tax revenues than to vary tax revenues. 
In this respect, the focus of attention on tax-varying powers 
is misplaced. Powers at both regional and local levels to 
vary income from service charges should be recognised 
more fully. Existing powers to charge service users are 
arguably grossly under-developed. Ultimately, the greatest 
potential for varying revenues relates to non-tax revenues, 
not to tax revenues. Whilst the power to vary taxes may 
indeed be more symbolic than real, powers to vary charges 
are both real and substantial. 
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